Interview d'un ancien RIO, devenu écrivain:
https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this- ... 1725012279Tactique initial contre Mig17 et Mig21: balancer un max de Sparrow avant le merge:
> Our weapon during the intercept was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which was much improved since its flawed debut in Vietnam and had become a reliable and versatile weapon. But in my experience we often wouldn’t kill-remove adversaries based on pre-merge shots because we wanted to maximize the number we faced in the within visual range engagement.
Voler bas, c'était le must:
> The Tomcat was strongest below 20,000 feet, and lower was better. But of course the soft deck and hard deck safety restrictions usually kept us from going too low. A Tomcat fighting in the thick air below 5,000 feet altitude maneuvered the way you always wanted it to!
Le travail du RIO en dog, surtout derrière 3h-9h
> Depending on the scenario, the RIO’s priority would be defensive visual scan (behind the 3-9 line), facilitated by the 360-degree view from the cockpit. Any good RIO could see between the tails, though it was hard at 6.5G! The RIO coordinated with the pilot to keep track of bandits and wingmen through effective communications and handoffs.
> The RIO’s eyes were seemingly everywhere at once, watching the bandit being chased, watching airspeed, watching altitude, watching fuel state, keeping sight of wingmen, clearing their six o’clock, as well as our own. “Watch right four o’clock low.” “Got him. Sluggo is engaged at left eight.” “Visual.” The RIO always had to be ready to activate VSL – vertical scan lock-on, one of the most useful of the radar’s dogfight modes – when an adversary was coming into the scan volume off the nose of the jet. Employing cockpit resource management principles, the RIO would act as copilot, keeping tabs on fuel, navigation, range time – whatever it took to win the engagement and complete the mission safely.
Dans un premier temps, le Phoenix est réservé aux éventuel Raid Soviet contre les CVN, il est trop lourd pour affronter des chasseurs
> Anyway, the penalties for this capability included weight and drag. We would carry the Phoenix on the belly (also known as the tunnel), and that required adapter rails that weighed 400 lbs each and added drag. Each missile itself weighed 1,000 lbs. But the reason we didn’t use them against fighters was policy: carriers planned to save AIM-54s for use against a raid by a Soviet bomber regiment. On my first tour we were never in a real-world counter-air situation so I don’t know for sure, but that’s how we trained: against enemy fighters it was AIM-7s, AIM-9s, and the gun
Mise en place de nouvelles tactiques BVR:
> Basic information on BVR tactics is familiar to enthusiasts. Think back to when it was new, however, when we had to admit we had a vulnerability that was something we could mitigate if we learned the details of AIM-7 performance compared to the Soviet AA-7 (and later the AA-10). We learned how to optimize our launch range and reduce the enemy’s by working against his radar and his missile.
Refus du combat:
> Sometimes we launched AIM-7s and maneuvered to avoid the merge.
Les Phoenix seront utilisé contre les chasseurs avec le 54C à partir de 1987
> When we started to get serious about the threat, especially when the AA-10 Alamo arrived, we realized we had to employ AIM-54s against enemy fighters. So of course we began to train with them. I think the capability was in TACTS all along, we just never used it. Fortunately the Navy introduced the AIM-54C in 1987, when we really needed it. The Charlie corrected many shortcomings of the Alpha, in both outer air battle and closer-in tactical environments. With its long motor burn time, large warhead, and radar improvements, the AIM-54C was a tenacious missile. Again, it is too bad it doesn’t have a combat record.
> One of the coolest visuals I remember was from TACTS debriefs at Fallon, when a division of Tomcats launched AIM-54Cs against simulated Fulcrums at 30-plus miles. A few seconds after launch the debriefer rotated the view from overhead to horizontal, and there were four Phoenixes performing their trajectory-shaping climbs. AIM-54s were not 100% kills, but they sure started to reduce the threat as scenarios developed.
En 1997, l'emport de Phoenix est mentionné pour l’exclusion du survol du sud de l'Irak, (la question qui reste: combien de Phoenix emporté par F-14)
> but as soon as we arrived the violations stopped. It would be speculation on my part about whether they recognized the presence of the Tomcat’s AWG9 and didn’t want to deal with Phoenix.
Info intéressante sur l'évolution du poids maximum de F14 à l'appontage, qui passe de 51800 à 54000
> The Navy increased the F-14’s max trap weight from 51,800 pounds to 54,000, which may not seem like much but it added a bit more safety factor to our recovery fuel, or meant we could bring back the ordnance we carried.
, malgré un Mig-23 "Flogger" (désolé Miguel fallait que je le dise 
) doté de la Kryptonite. Le RIO leader, je suis pour! 
(juste deux bidons à repeindre)
